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COMMENT
HELLER V. DOE: INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT UNDER A
REASONABLE DOUBT
"[T]he mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to
be treated equally by the law.'
INTRODUCTION
Differences in treatment between the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill have "long existed in Anglo-American law."2 Nevertheless, criticism of this
distinction has grown in recent years.3 In Heller v. Doe,' the United States
Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit this approach and abolish the
disparity. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the distinction and upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Kentucky statute that sanctioned differential treatment of the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill with regard to involuntary commitment
proceedings.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that the statute did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by designating a lower burden of
proof for the commitment of the mentally retarded than for the mentally ill.'
The Court also held (6-3) that the statute did not violate equal protection or
due process by permitting close family members and guardians to participate
as parties in the commitment proceedings for the mentally retarded but not the
mentally ill.6 The Court in effect bent-over-backwards to uphold the statute."
I. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985).
2. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2646 (1993).
3. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 37 (3d
ed. 1985).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
5. kI. at 2640.
6. hI. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The due process issue in Heller
is beyond the scope of this comment and will not be addressed.
7. Leon Friedman, Retroactivity, Equal Protection and Standing, 10 TOURO L. REV.
503, 513 (1994). Professor Friedman asserts that the importance of the Heller decision lies in
"the extraordinary deference the Supreme Court gives to the rational relationship test." Id. at
511-12. Friedman describes the Court's review of the Kentucky statute as "the most extraor-
dinary deference I have ever seen," referring to the standard the Court applied as "the lean-
over-backwards test." Id. at 513.
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The Majority reasoned that the law's historical treatment of the mentally re-
tarded and the mentally ill as distinct classes suggests a "commonsense dis-
tinction" exists between them.' This circular logic, used to justify maintaining
the status quo, exemplifies the weakness of the Majority's arguments in
overturning the two lower court decisions at issue.
.This Comment analyzes the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the
Majority's decision in Heller by comparing it to the Court's prior decisions
and to the legally and factually based arguments of Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion. Part I provides a historical backdrop to the class distinction and a
description of the Kentucky statute at issue. This section also includes a brief
synopsis of the equal protection, followed by an examination of recent Su-
preme Court decisions addressing the constitutional rights of the mentally ill
and mentally retarded. Part II describes the factual and procedural background
of Heller v. Doe and explains the majority and dissenting opinions. Part III
scrutinizes the Court's reasoning in light of its previous opinions and argues
that the statute fails the "rational basis" test. This section also criticizes the
Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the statute's constitutional-
ity. Ultimately, this Comment endorses the elimination of unequal treatment
between the mentally retarded and the mentally ill with respect to the adjudi-
catory process required to deny a person's constitutional right to liberty.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of Class Distinction
English common law applied to the mentally ill ("lunatics") and the men-
tally retarded ("idiots") in different manners.9 The King had a duty to provide
both classes with "necessaries" and preserve their estates, but was only re-
quired to take on retarded individuals as wards." While the King was prohib-
ited from profiting from his care of the mentally ill, the law permitted him to
profit from his wardship of the mentally retarded." Depriving a person of his
property and profits was apparently the principal purpose of an "idiocy" adju-
dication. 2
The legal distinction between the two groups continues in some respects
today. Forty-five United States jurisdictions have separate involuntary commit-
ment statutes, and some have separate agencies for addressing the needs of
8. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646.
9. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646 (citing 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 481 (2d ed. 1909)).
10. Id. (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES '302-04).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2656 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND AD-
VOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 10 (1983)). "Lunatics" were viewed as "demonically pos-
sessed or the products of parental sin" and were generally "punished or left to perish." Id.
(citing HERR, supra at 9). Individuals perceived as mentally ill or mentally retarded were
often lumped together, however, in the "lunacy" category. HERR, supra at 9. Although the
distinction between "idiocy" and "lunacy" existed before the nineteenth century, "the two
conditions were often confused." Id.
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each group. 3 Consistent with the modem trend toward legal homogenization,
the judicial commitment procedures for both classes show, however, an in-
creasing uniformity among the states.1
4
B. Kentucky's Statutory Scheme Governing Involuntary Commitment
Kentucky law provides a mentally ill or mentally retarded individual with
a judicial hearing prior to involuntary commitment. 5 To warrant confinement
in an institution, the state must establish that the person 1) suffers from the
alleged defect (mental illness or retardation), 2) presents a threat of danger to
self, family or others, 3) can reasonably benefit from the available treatment,
and 4) is one for whom the institution is the least restrictive mode of treatment
presently available. 6 While the state must establish these requirements "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" for the involuntary commitment of an allegedly
mentally ill individual, it must only meet a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard for the involuntary commitment of an allegedly mentally retarded
individual. 7 Except for this distinction, the rules of procedure and evidence
for these commitment hearings are the same as those for any criminal proceed-
ing.'" In addition, family members or guardians of the mentally retarded may
participate in the proceedings as a party, which gives them power to cross
examine witnesses and standing to appeal the final decision. 9 The statute
does not provide these rights to the family members or guardians of the men-
tally ill.2"
C. Equal Protection Analysis Summary
The Kentucky statute facially discriminates against the mentally retarded,
raising equal protection concerns. According to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws."'" Al-
13. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646-47 n.2. Six states, however, do not distinguish be-
tween the two groups in their involuntary commitment laws. Id.
14. BRAKEL, supra note 3, at 56. While the trend during the 1970s and 1980s was
toward developing separate legislation for the judicial commitment of the mentally ill and
retarded, id. at 37, today only marginal differences exist between these laws. Id. at 56. A
trend toward abolishing the involuntary commitment of retarded people altogether has also
evolved recently. Id. at 37.
15. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.051(9) (mental illness); 202B.100(8) (mental retarda-
tion) (Michie 1990). "[If the court at the preliminary hearing] finds there is probable cause
to believe the respondent should be involuntarily admitted, the court shall order a final hear-
ing to determine if the respondent should be involuntarily admitted." §202A.051(9).
Respondents' right to the preliminary hearing is waivable, but their right to the final hearing
is not waivable. § 202A.076(i)-(2) (mental illness); § 202B.160(i)-(2) (mental retardation).
16. § 202A.026 (mental illness); § 202B.040 (mental retardation).
17. § 202A.076(2) (mental illness); § 202B.160(2) (mental retardation).
18. § 202A.076(2) (mental illness); § 202B.160(2) (mental retardation).
19. § 202B.160(3).
20. See § 202A.076.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
1995]
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though the Supreme Court interprets this language as mandating similar treat-
ment of all persons "similarly situated," states are allowed wide latitude under
the Equal Protection Clause out of respect for their individual sovereign pow-
ers.22 To survive judicial review under this clause, a state need only show
that its statutory classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est."23 Legislation that is subjected to the "rational basis" standard is pre-
sumed constitutional and the burden is on the challenger "to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foun-
dation in the record. 24
Courts apply strict scrutiny, however, when examining the constitution-
ality of government actions that impinge on fundamental rights25 or that are
"drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alien-
age."'26 To qualify as "suspect," a class must satisfy three criteria: 1) society
historically has subjected the group to purposeful discriminatory treatment, 2)
the characteristic(s) responsible for the group's suffering are immutable, and
3) society historically has restricted the group's access to the political pro-
cess." When examining this last requirement, courts look to whether the
class lacks the ability to attract lawmakers' attention, not whether the class is
merely "powerless to assert direct control over the legislature."2 This height-
ened standard of review requires that the statutory classification be "suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."'  This test presumes the
legislation's invalidity and places the burden on the state to prove it satisfies
the standard.'
Finally, courts apply a middle standard of heightened judicial scrutiny to
classifications that satisfy some, but not all, of the "suspect" requirements.
These "quasi-suspect" classifications, like suspect classifications, are based on
immutable characteristics unrelated to an individual's ability to contribute to
society." Courts apply "intermediate" scrutiny to classifications based on ille-
gitimacy or gender,32 but refuse this application when evaluating the constitu-
22. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 431 (1979) (stating that "Itihe essence of federalism is that states must be free to de-
velop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold").
23. City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
24. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993) (citation omitted).
25. Examples of fundamental rights include the right to vote, Burson v. Freeman, 112
S. Ct. 1846, 1847 (1992); the right to interstate travel, Attomey General v. Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. 898, 924 (1986); and the right to marital privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
26. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
27. Leslie H. Powers, Note, Less Equal Than Others: Persons with Mental Retardation,
Equal Protection and Deinstitutionalization, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINE-
MENT 81, 89 (1989); see also United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
28. Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal.
1993) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445).
29. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
30. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
31. Id.
32. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1988); Pow-
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tionality of differential legislative treatment based on age,33 wealth, 4 or ho-
mosexuality. 5 Under intermediate scrutiny, legislative discriminatory treat-
ment violates the Equal Protection Clause unless the classification is "substan-
tially related" to an important governmental interest.36
D. Supreme Court Decisions Affecting the Mentally Ill and Mentally
Retarded
1. Basis of the Heller Decision
Prior cases supporting the Heller decision addressed such issues as the
standard of proof for commitment and suspect classifications. In Addington v.
Texas, 37 the Court addressed the appropriate standard of proof required by the
Fourteenth Amendment for the involuntary civil commitment of an individual
to a state mental hospital." The trial judge instructed the jury that the pro-
posed patient must be found by "clear ... and convincing evidence" to be 1)
mentally ill and 2) in need of hospitalization for either his own welfare and
protection or the protection of others.39 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
held that due process required the higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard of proof used in criminal prosecutions.' The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and held that a "preponderance of the evidence," the lower standard
used in civil litigation, was appropriate.4
The United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld the original "clear and
convincing" standard.42 The Court reasoned that the "function of a standard
of proof" is "to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate
the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision."43 Asserting that
"the function of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous deci-
sions,"" the Court recognized that any civil commitment constitutes a
"significant deprivation of liberty" requiring due process protection." With
ers, supra note 28, at 90-91.
33. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
34. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
35. See Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D.
Cal. 1993). But see Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 440 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (concluding that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals qualify for "quasi-suspect" class
status). The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue.
36. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. For criticism of this complicated multi-level
analysis, see id. (Stevens, J., concurring), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
38. Id. at 419.
39. Id. at 421.
40. Id. at 422.
41. Id. The court relied on its previous decision in State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563
(Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929 (1978). Turner held that the preponderance of evi-
dence standard of proof satisfied due process in civil commitment proceedings. Id. at 566.
42. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.
43. Id. at 423.
44. Id. at 425.
45. Id.
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such an interest at stake, the Court held that the middle level "clear and con-
vincing" burden of proof was appropriate because it "strikes a fair balance
between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the
state." The Court also made clear that states are free to apply the stricter
"beyond a reasonable doubt" criminal standard, but may not utilize any stan-
dard more lenient than the "clear and convincing" constitutional minimum.47
Importantly, the Addington decision did not identify the appropriate standard
of proof for the involuntary commitment of the mentally retarded.4"
Although presented with the issue in Schweiker v. Wilson,49 the Supreme
Court never expressly determined whether the mentally ill qualify as a "sus-
pect class."' " Schweiker addressed the constitutionality of two Federal Social
Security Act provisions." The provisions in question reduced the amount of
benefits received by otherwise eligible individuals who resided in public men-
tal institutions and were not in receipt of Medicaid funds for their care.52 The
Court held that the legislative distinction satisfied the rational-basis test and
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause." The Court reasoned that a statu-
tory classification merely requires a "reasonable basis" and does not offend the
Constitution simply because it is "imperfect" due to its inequitable results.'
Plaintiffs asserted that the class satisfied "suspect class" criteria and warranted
a heightened standard of review. The Court avoided this issue by concluding
that the statute did not directly classify on the basis of mental health." Ac-
cording to the Court, the statute distinguished between residents in public
institutions receiving Medicaid funds and residents in such institutions not
receiving Medicaid." Since the Act did not distinguish between the mentally
ill and nonmentally ill, the "suspect class" question was left unanswered."
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cr., Inc.," the Court found that
the mentally retarded did not qualify as a "suspect class." The Court did hold,
nevertheless, that a Texas city's zoning ordinance requiring a special permit
for the operation of a mentally retarded group home violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because it failed the rational-basis test." The Court concluded
that the special permit requirement was not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental interest, but appeared to be based on an "irrational prejudice"
46. Id. at 431.
47. Id. at 433.
48. Id. at 433 (stating that the determination of the precise burden is a matter of state
law).
49. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
50. Id. at 230-31.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(l)(A),(B) (1988).
52. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 222.
53. Id. at 237.
54. Id. at 234 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
55. Id. at 231.
56. Id. at 232-33.
57. Id.
58. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). For an in-depth analysis of the, effects of the City of
Cleburne decision, see generally Powers, supra note 27.
59. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
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against the mentally retarded.' Although the Court seemed to alter the ratio-
nal-basis standard by shifting the burden of proof to the city,6 it refused to
apply a heightened standard of review. The Court provided four rationales for
holding that the mentally retarded did not qualify as a "quasi-suspect" class."
First, the Court reasoned that although mental retardation is an immutable
characteristic, there is a wide range among individuals' level of disability.
63
This diversity suggests a preference for professionally-influenced legislative
decisions regarding the legal treatment of this class over the, perhaps ill-in-
formed, opinions of the judiciary.' Second, the Court found that the federal
government's action in outlawing discrimination against the mentally retarded
in federally funded programs negated any claim of invidious discrimination.65
Congress bestowed on this class the right to appropriate habilitation, services,
and treatment in a setting that least restricts their personal liberty.'
Third, the aforementioned legislative response mutes any claim that the
mentally retarded are politically powerless due to their inability to attract
lawmakers' attention.6 Moreover, since any minority can be said to be pow-
erless to assert direct control over the legislature, many laws would be deemed
suspect if that were a requirement for heightened judicial scrutiny.'
Finally, the Court feared difficulty in finding a principled method of dif-
ferentiating the mentally retarded from various other groups with arguably
immutable disabilities who also lack power to mandate favorable legislation
and can legitimately claim to be victimized by public discrimination.' The
Court cited the mentally ill, the aging, the infirm, and the physically disabled
as examples.7" In addition, the Court noted that classifications based on other
related immutable characteristics, such as intelligence and physical disability,
are typically accepted as valid because they are often relevant to legitimate
governmental purposes.7
City of Cleburne did not involve involuntary commitment or any type of
incarceration that would restrict an individual's constitutional right to freedom.
Therefore the Court was not required to decide how the issue of "fundamental
rights" would affect the standard of review applied to laws discriminating on
the basis of mental retardation.
60. Id. at 450.
61. The Court supported the court of appeals in noting that the city never justified "its
apparent view that other people can live under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally
retarded persons cannot." Id. (quoting City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc., 726
F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984)).
62. Id. at 442-45.
63. See id. at 442.
64. Id. at 443.
65. See id.
66. Id. (citing Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6010()-(2) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6009(l)-(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
67. Id. at 445.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 445-46.
71. Id. at 433 n.10.
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Five years after the City of Cleburne decision, Congress passed the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 2 The ADA indicated that men-
tally disabled persons are a "discrete and insular minority. '73 This language
suggests that Congress intended to overrule City of Cleburne's holding that the
mentally retarded are not a "suspect class." By virtue of this language in the
ADA, Congress appears to be sanctioning strict judicial scrutiny of any law
that discriminates against the mentally disabled. It is doubtful, however, that
the judiciary is bound by this congressional assertion.74
2. Other Significant Cases
In advocating the statute's failure of the "rational basis" test, the challeng-
ing class in Heller relied on one significant case, Baxstrom v. Herold.75 In
Baxstrom, the Court held that a New York statute violated equal protection by
permitting a person to be civilly committed when his criminal sentence ex-
pired without providing him the jury review available to all others being civil-
ly committed in that state.7 ' Although equal protection does not require that
all persons be dealt with identically, it does require that differential treatment
be somewhat relevant to the purpose for which the classification was creat-
72. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V
1993).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(7), 12102(2). Congress found:
[llndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and result-
ing from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society ....
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Mentally retarded people are included in this class. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2). One purpose of the ADA is "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, in-
cluding the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment ... in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b)(4).
74. Lower courts are split on this issue, but most hold that the congressional finding
does not overrule City of Cleburne, and thus has no effect on judicial equal protection anal-
ysis. See Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993);
More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d. 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 74 (1993);
Thornton v. City of Allegan, 863 F. Supp. 504, 508 (W.D. Mich. 1993); see also Trautz v.
Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that while the "discrete and
insular minority" classification is relevant to § 1985(c) claims, it does not sanction height-
ened scrutiny in an equal protection analysis). But see Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp.
1175, 1209 (S.D. Ohio 1993) ("Congress is far better equipped than the courts accurately to
make such findings. The Court cannot ignore Congress' [sic] finding.") While Congress's
findings "do not overrule the U.S. Supreme Court on an issue of law ... [here] Congress
has made purely factual findings." id. Congress's finding is purely factual "even though ...
[it] is purposely couched in terms used by the U.S. Supreme Court in equal protection cas-
es." Id. at 1209 n.28. Based on Congress's finding in the ADA, the court held in Martin
that a minimum of intermediate scrutiny was applicable. Id. at 1210.
75. 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see Brief for Respondent at 14, Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct.
2637 (1993) (No. 92-351) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
76. Baxtrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
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ed." The Court found that while the classification of a mentally ill person as
either insane or dangerously insane can be a reasonable distinction when made
in the context of determining the type of care to be given, it is not relevant to
the purpose of showing whether a person is mentally ill in the first place.78
Therefore, the Court concluded there was no conceivable basis for the statuto-
ry distinction.79 The Baxtrom decision suggests that a distinction between two
groups, for example the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, can be relevant
when determining the appropriateness of care and treatment. The decision also
asserts, however, that such a distinction may not be rationally related to the
purpose of showing whether an individual initially qualifies for one of the
groups.
Prior to the Court's decision in Heller, several cases addressed the free-
dom rights, or liberty interests, of the mentally ill and mentally retarded.
These cases will be discussed chronologically. The first three decisions fo-
cused on the rights of the mentally ill.
First, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,"° the Court held that, under the Consti-
tution, a state may not confine a non-dangerous mentally ill individual who is
capable of living safely in freedom.8' The Court reasoned that public intoler-
ance or animosity did not provide sufficient justification for depriving a person
of his or her physical liberty.82 Because involuntary confinement based solely
on a diagnosis of mental illness violates the constitutional right to freedom, a
valid determination of the individual's dangerousness, either to himself or
others, is also required to justify confinement.83 The O'Connor ruling, decid-
ed four years before Addington, gave no intimation as to the proper standard
for proving an individual dangerous.
Next, in Parham v. J.R.,s' the Court held that a Georgia statute permit-
ting parents or guardians to commit minor children to a state mental hospital
on a voluntary basis was not unconstitutional per se.8" The Court recognized,
however, that a child has constitutionally protectible interests in not being
erroneously labeled as mentally ill and in being free of unnecessary bodily
restraints.86 As a result, the Court ruled that the statute required revisions in
order to protect children's liberty rights.87 Due to the significant risk of error
involved in allowing a parental decision to institutionalize a child, the Court
required inquiry by a neutral factfinder to determine whether statutory admis-
sion requirements had been met.88 The Court also required that the neutral
77. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 111-12.
80. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
81. Id. at 576.
82. Id. at 575.
83. See id. at 576.
84. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
85. Id. at 616-17.
86. Id. at 601.
87. See id. at 601, 606-07.
88. Id. at 606.
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party be given the authority to refuse admittance of a child who fails to satisfy
the requisite medical standards.8 9 As a final prerequisite to the statute's ap-
proval, the Court required a similarly independent periodic review of each
child's need for continuing commitment.' °
The following year, in Vitek v. Jones,9 the Court struck down as
unconsitutional a Nebraska statute that allowed the involuntary transfer of
criminally convicted prisoners to a state mental hospital for the treatment of
mental illness.92 The statute violated the prisoners' due process rights because
it failed to provide them with notice, a hearing, an opportunity to present a
defense, an independent decision maker, a written statement justifying a deci-
sion to transfer, and legal counsel.93 While the Court recognized that commit-
ment to a mental hospital results in "a massive curtailment of liberty" for the
ordinary citizen,94 it found that a valid criminal conviction and the resulting
prison sentence extinguish a convict's right to freedom from confinement.95
Ultimately, however, the Court reasoned that the loss of liberty that involun-
tary commitment produces is greater than the loss of freedom from confine-
ment because of the stigmatizing consequences and mandatory behavior modi-
fication treatment that accompany commitment to a mental hospital.'
Youngberg v. Romeo97 directly addressed the liberty interests of the men-
tally retarded.98 In Youngberg, the Court held that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, mentally retarded individuals have a con-
stitutionally protected right to reasonably nonrestrictive confinement condi-
tions, as well as the right to safe conditions of care and adequate training
required to protect those interests.' The Court noted that freedom from bodi-
ly restraint has always been considered to be at the core of liberty protected
from arbitrary governmental action." ° The Court reasoned that because the
right to that particular type of freedom continues to survive even in the crimi-
nal system of incarceration, it must also survive with respect to involuntary
commitment.'
Because the confined individual in Youngberg did not challenge his com-
89. Id. at 607.
90. Id.
91. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
92. Id. at 491. But see People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981) (automatic com-
mitment of an insanity aquittee does not violate due process).
93. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-95.
94. Id. (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
95. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Cor-
rectional Complex, 442 U.S. I, 7 (1979)).
96. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494.
97. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For an analysis of the effects of the Youngberg decision, see
Diane M. Weidert, Comment, Constitutional Rights of the Involuntarily Committed Mentally
Retarded After Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1113 (1983).
98. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314-15.
99. Id. at 324.




mitment,0 2 the Court had no occasion to designate the proper burden of
proof necessary to commit a retarded individual involuntarily. 3 In determin-
ing whether a committed individual should be denied his right to be free of
restraint, however, the Court did not refer to the Addington standard of "clear
and convincing evidence" of dangerousness.'" Instead, the Court invoked the
lower standard of "professional judgment"'0 " that allowed the individual staff
member in charge to decide whether restraints were appropriate.
Finally, in Foucha v. Louisiana," a person acquitted by reason of
insanity who was cured of his mental illness challenged the constitutionality of
a state statute that failed to provide him with the same procedural safeguards
against unwarranted confinement that were guaranteed to those facing civil
commitment."' Faced with an equal protection issue, the Court relied on
Youngberg to determine that freedom from physical confinement was a "fun-
damental right" triggering strict scrutiny." Because the Court found no
compelling reason for the discrimination, they concluded that the statute vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause and was therefore unconstitutional."' 9 Al-
though Foucha involved mental illness, the basis for the decision rested on the
fundamental right to be free from physical confinement identified in
Youngberg.
The timing of the Foucha decision was significant because it occurred
several months before Heller v. Doe was brought before the Supreme Court,
but after the Sixth Circuit decided Heller on equal protection grounds. One
could logically assume that the Court would apply either the
Foucha/Youngberg rule establishing an individual's fundamental right to free-
dom or the Baxtrom decision regarding initial classification. The Court de-
clined to take either approach.
II. HELLER v. DOE
A. Facts and Procedural History
Heller began as a civil rights class action attempting to stop the institu-
102. Id. at 315.
103. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 37-48.
105. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
106. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
107. Id. at 1782.
108. Id. at 1788. The statute in Foucha was struck down on substantive due process
grounds. Id. at 1781. The equal protection decision was decided by a plurality, with four
justices joining the "fundamental rights" ruling. Justice O'Connor did not address the "funda-
mental rights" question because she joined the decision with respect to due process consider-
ations only, finding it unnecessary to examine equal protection issues. Id. at 1790-91.
109. Id. at 1788-89. In Foucha, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding that due process requires that "the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted"). Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators
in Kansas: A Modem Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 899 (1994).
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tionalization of mentally retarded adults under unconstitutional circumstanc-
es.' 0 Plaintiff, Samuel Doe, represented a class of citizens similarly situated
as involuntarily committed mentally retarded adults in the state of Ken-
tucky."' The Kentucky Cabinet of Human Resources ("CHR") had no
knowledge of the whereabouts of plaintiff at the time of the decision because
a fictitious name had been used to identify him since the beginning of the
suit.'"2
The specific issues raised by the litigation changed with each of the four
decisions leading up to Heller. The original suit challenged the constitutional-
ity of a Kentucky statute that considered a mentally retarded adult's commit-
ment by a parent or guardian to be "voluntary" and therefore required no
judicial hearing on the matter." 3 The district court determined that these
commitments were "involuntary" because they occurred without the
individual's consent."4 The district court also held that the statute, by requir-
ing a judicial hearing for the mentally ill but not for the mentally retarded
prior to involuntary commitment, violated the Equal Protection Clause." 5 Af-
ter acknowledging -that significant differences exist between the two
groups," 6 the court concluded that no rational basis existed for the class
distinction with respect to initial involuntary commitment."7 The district
court ordered the state to provide a judicial hearing to any allegedly mentally
retarded adult facing involuntary commitment."8  The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's equal protection decision."9 The court of appeals held
unanimously that while due process does not require a judicial hearing under
the circumstances, equal protection does require a hearing because the state
lacks a rational basis for providing a hearing to the mentally ill but not the
mentally retarded. 2 ° The court found the distinction between the classes rele-
vant only with regard to the frequency of judicial review regulating continued
confinement.' 2' The Supreme Court denied CHR's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari later that year.
2
In response to Sixth Circuit's decision, the Kentucky General Assembly
quickly revised the statute before the district court could enact an agreed-upon
compliance plan designed to implement the previous decisions of both
courts.23 The plan would have required the state to provide the mentally re-
tarded with the same rights and procedures as the mentally ill when facing in-
110. Brief for Respondent at 1.
111. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, 110 (6th Cir. 1992).
112. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Heller v. Doe 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (No. 92-351).
113. Doe v. Austin, 668 F. Supp. 597, 600 (W.D. Ky. 1986).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 601.
116. Id. at 600.
117. Id. at 601.
118. Id. at 602.
119. Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).
120. Id. at 1395.
121. Id. at 1396.
122. Cowherd v. Doe, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).
123. Brief for Respondent at 6-7.
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voluntary commitment." Instead, the statutory revisions resulted in two sig-
nificant new differences in treatment. First, the standard of proof for institu-
tionalizing the allegedly mentally retarded was lowered to "clear and convinc-
ing evidence." Second, family members and guardians of an allegedly retarded
person were granted party status in the commitment process, giving them the
right to an appeal."
The next round of litigation challenged the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive revisions.'26 The district court responded by holding that both new pro-
visions violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2' CHR defended the lower bur-
den of proof under Addington v. Texas, which permitted the "clear and con-
vincing" standard for involuntary commitment of the mentally ill. 28 In de-
ciding the case, the court relied, however, on a previous Sixth Circuit decision
and cited City of Cleburne29 as the appropriate precedent in holding that leg-
islation sanctioning differential treatment of the mentally retarded from the
mentally ill in commitment proceedings failed the rational basis test." In
addition, the court reasoned that Kentucky law provides that "when a proceed-
ing may lead to the loss of personal liberty, the defendant in that proceeding
should be afforded the same constitutional protection as is given to the ac-
cused in a criminal prosecution."'' This constitutional protection includes
judgement under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
The court then ruled that the threat to personal liberty is identical for both
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. Because the statute failed the
rational basis test, the court did not find it necessary to address the "strict
scrutiny" issue. The district court then enjoined Kentucky from applying or
enforcing either provision."'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed the district court's decision
regarding the equal protection challenge."3 CHR asserted that the many dif-
ferences between the mentally ill and mentally retarded provided a reasonable
basis for the different standards of proof.'35 The Sixth Circuit found that
simply identifying differences between classes is not sufficient to satisfy equal
protection demands-the distinctions must be relevant to the classification's
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(2)-(3) (Michie 1991).
126. See Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
127. Id. at 358.
128. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32); see supra text accompanying
notes 38-49.
129. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1988).
130. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 358; see supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
131. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 358 (quoting Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681,
682 (Ky. 1964)).
132. Id. at 358.
133. Id. at 359.
134. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1992).
135. See id. at 112. CHR contended that mental retardation I) is a permanent, incurable
condition while mental illness is treatable, 2) is not treated, but requires "habilitation" on a
continuing basis, 3) requires less intrusive services than mental illness, and 4) is less stigma-
tized than mental illness. Id.
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purpose.'36 The court found no evidentiary support in the trial record for the
differences CHR claimed were relevant.'
37
The court also reasoned that allowing third parties to participate in the
proceedings as parties with the right to appeal would impose a greater burden
than is imposed on similarly situated mentally ill adults, especially when their
"interests may be adverse to the person facing commitment."'38 The court
noted its holding in a previous case that the decision to commit is not within
the discretion of a mentally retarded adult's parent or guardian.'39 The circuit
court found no rational basis for distinguishing between the mentally ill and
retarded in this regard."
CHR again petitioned the Supreme Court in a final attempt to defend the
Kentucky statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
Kentucky's statutory class distinction between the mentally retarded and the
mentally ill violated the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Majority Opinion
In determining what level of judicial scrutiny to apply to Kentucky's
statutory class distinction, the Court conceded that although heightened scruti-
ny may have applied, the issue was not properly presented because all four of
the cases below had been litigated and decided under the rational basis theo-
ry. '4 The lower standard of review did not require the state to make the
extensive evidentiary showing necessary for the statute to survive heightened
scrutiny. The Court, therefore, ruled that it would be unfair and imprudent to
inject a more stringent standard at such a late stage in the litigation.'42 The
Court applied minimum rationality, requiring the state to show that its differ-
ential statutory treatment of allegedly mentally retarded persons facing invol-
untary commitment was reasonably related to some legitimate governmental
purpose.'43 Additionally, the majority denied that anything other than the tra-
ditional rational-basis standard had been applied in City of Cleburne.'"
In its equal protection analysis, the Court adhered to the principle that a
classification should be upheld if any reasonably conceivable state of facts
could provide a rational basis for the distinction."' The Court ruled that a
state must merely present a plausible argument to justify legislative discrimi-
136. Id. (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, Ill (1966)).
137. Id. at 112.
138. Id. at 113.
139, Id. (citing Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
967 (1988)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2642.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2643; see City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).




nation, placing the burden on the challenging party to "negative every conceiv-
able basis" that could support the classification." CHR asserted that differ-
ences between the groups justified the disparity in treatment.47 The Supreme
Court agreed with CHR and viewed the distinctions as rational. 4
The Court concluded that three differences were relevant to the purposes
served by the lower standard of proof. First, it found that mental retardation is
easier to diagnose than mental illness because it is a developmental disability
that becomes apparent during childhood.'49 In contrast, mental illness can
have sudden manifestations after adulthood is reached."5 In the Court's
view, the relative ease of diagnosing mental retardation justified the lower
burden of proof.' Second, because mental retardation is a permanent, rela-
tively static condition when compared to mental illness, a more accurate deter-
mination of dangerousness may be based on any instances of violent behavior
in the mentally retarded individual's past. 5 2 In comparison, with mental ill-
ness past behavior may not be an adequate predictor of future actions.'53
Finally, the Court found that treatment methods for mental retardation
were much less invasive than those for mental illness.'" Whereas mentally
ill persons may be subjected to personally intrusive medical and psychiatric
treatment, including psychotropic drug treatment, the mentally retarded are
provided "habilitation" consisting of education and training intended to im-
prove their self-sufficiency skills.' The Court conceded that the loss of
freedom both groups experience following commitment may be similar, and
that some committed mentally retarded adults may be subjected to more intru-
sive treatments during confinement.'56 The Court reasoned, however, that the
Kentucky legislature could have plausibly believed that most committed men-
146. Id. at 2643 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364
(1973)). Several lower courts have since cited Heller confirming that the burden of proof
remains on the challenger when applying the rational basis standard. See, e.g., Contractors
Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1011 (3d Cir. 1993); Dahl v. Secretary of the
United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
147. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643.
148. See id. at 2647.
149. Id. at 2643.
150. Id. at 2644. The Court found CHR's premise that mental retardation is easier to
diagnose than mental illness had a sufficient factual basis. Id. (citing James W. Ellis & Ruth
A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 438-39
(1985)).
151. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2644. The Sixth Circuit did not address this argument in its
Cowherd decision. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). The district court, however, found that the relative ease of
diagnosing mental retardation was only relevant to the frequency of reviewing an individual's
need for continued confinement. Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354, 358 (W.D. Ky. 1991),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
152. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2644.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2645.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2645-46.
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tally retarded persons receive different, less invasive treatment than the men-
tally ill. 57 It concluded that a legislature is permitted to use this sort of gen-
eralization under minimum rationality review because the issue was at least
debatable.5 ' The Court noted that each of the three arguments alone were
sufficient to satisfy a rational basis test.'59
The Court also upheld the statutory distinction allowing family members
and guardians to participate as parties in the commitment proceedings of the
allegedly mentally retarded, but not in those of the allegedly mentally ill."6
The Court found that two of the contended differences were rationally related
to the state's purpose for distinguishing between the two groups.'6 ' The
Court found that sudden onset during adulthood could preclude family mem-
bers from knowing of a mentally ill person's condition because they are no
longer regularly caring for the individual.'62 In comparison, the onset of
mental retardation during a person's developmental years would give the fami-
ly members opportunity to make observations which are important to the de-
termination of the proper treatment for that individual.'63 In addition, the
Court found that the mentally ill have a greater need for privacy than the
mentally retarded."6 This rationale justified keeping the number of third par-
ties attending the commitment proceedings for the mentally ill to a mini-
mum. 65 The Court speculated that the Kentucky legislature could have al-
lowed the relatives and guardians of a mentally retarded person to participate
in the hearing without granting them party status."'6 The Court ruled, howev-
er, that even if a less restrictive alternative method exists, such an alternative
must be disregarded if the state advances a reasonable and identifiable govern-
mental purpose for the statutory distinction.'67 Under the rational basis test, a




Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's refusal to address the ques-
tion of heightened scrutiny." She also agreed that permitting the relatives
and guardians of mentally retarded persons to participate as parties in commit-
157. Id. at 2646.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2647.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2647-48.
162. Id. at 2647.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Majority provided no support for this conclusion.
165. Id. at 2647-48.
166. Id. at 2648.
167. Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981)).
168. Heller. 113 S. Ct. at 2648 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. I, 51 (1973)).
169. Id. at 2650 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ment proceedings did not violate equal protection or procedural due pro-
cess. O'Connor, however, disagreed with the majority's upholding of the
differential standard of proof because she believed this aspect of the class
distinction was irrational. 7'
2. Justice Souter
Justice Souter's dissent initially questioned the majority's justification for
refusing to address the issue of heightened scrutiny.'72 He acknowledged
respondents' arguments that under Foucha v. Louisiana' a fundamental
right was at issue and that the mentally ill were designated a "suspect class"
by Congress with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."' Souter
concluded, however, that the issue need not be addressed because the class
distinctions created in Kentucky's statutory scheme failed even the rational-
basis test. 7 Souter also questioned the majority's failure to either apply or
overrule the City of Cleburne decision." 6 The Court in City of Cleburne
ruled that legislation discriminating against the mentally retarded was ground-
ed in "irrational prejudice" and therefore lacked a rational basis.'77 Souter
stated that he would have followed the City of Cleburne decision because it
had not been expressly overruled.'78 He argued that, in accordance with City
of Cleburne, the Court should have concluded that the differential treatment
sanctioned by the Kentucky statute also lacked any reasonable association to a
legitimate state interest.1
Souter then disputed each argument presented by the majority to justify
Kentucky's statutory class distinctions under rational-basis review. First, he
concluded that the differences between the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill did not rationally justify different standards of proof for involuntarily
committment to state institutions." Regarding the ease of diagnosis and de-
termination of dangerousness arguments, Souter declared that the majority
"misunderstands the principle object in setting burdens" when it bases a bur-
170. Id.
171. Id. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Souter's dissent only with respect to that one
issue. Justice Blackmun joined Souter's dissent in its entirety, as did Justice Stevens.
Blackmun only wrote separately to emphasize his belief that laws that infringe upon funda-
mental rights or discriminate against mentally retarded persons should be subjected to height-
ened judicial scrutiny. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
174. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 nn.1-2; see also Brief for Respondent at 27-32 (arguing
that Congress has indicated in the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993), that disabled persons are a "discrete and insular minority"
sanctioning strict judicial scrutiny of laws which discriminate against them).
175. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
178. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2652-53, 2656.
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den of proof on the difficulty of avoiding error.' Instead, he argued that the
burden of proof should be based on the importance of avoiding error viewed
from the perspective of the parties affected by the allocation.'82 Souter rea-
soned that no difference exists between the two groups with respect to their
rights to be free from bodily restraint and to avoid stigmatization. 3 He con-
cluded that there is "not a shred of rational support [for Kentucky's] decision
to discriminate against the mentally retarded in allocating the risk of erroneous
curtailment of liberty" because a mentally retarded person has as much to lose
from civil commitment as one who is mentally ill-including losses of free-
dom and privacy.'
Souter noted that Kentucky failed to explain how the permanency of men-
tal retardation could rationally justify the increased risk of erroneous curtail-
ment of liberty." 5 He pointed out that the decreased likelihood that perma-
nently mentally retarded persons would ever regain their freedom actually
supports the application of a higher standard of proof-not a lower
one-because there is so much at stake."s Souter also noted that the state
did not even attempt to justify the lower burden of proof in connection with
the last two statutory requirements: that the commitment be beneficial and that
it be the least restrictive alternative method of treatment. 87
Souter next responded to the argument that the mentally retarded receive
less invasive treatments than mentally ill. He disputed the majority's finding
that the Kentucky legislature could have plausibly believed that the mentally
retarded are subjected to less invasive medical or psychological treatments.'88
Citing numerous professional articles and studies, Souter stressed that psycho-
tropic drugs and behavior modification are no less commonly used, or mis-
used, in treating the mentally retarded than the mentally ill."s In fact, inva-
sive behavior therapy and drug therapy are often used together in treating the
mentally retarded."9 He concluded that no differences in therapeutic regimes
exist that could conceivably explain the less rigorous commitment standards
for the allegedly mentally retarded. 9'
Souter also objected to the disparity regarding the party-status of relatives
and guardians at commitment proceedings. He first reasoned that the distinc-
tions between the two groups the majority found relevant did not apply to the
guardian.'92 Guardians of both classes have equal legal obligations to protect
181. Id. at 2653.
182. Id.
183. See id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)).
184. Id. at 2653-54.
185. Id. at 2656 n.7.
186. Id. at 2656. The commitment of a mentally retarded person usually constitutes a
"life sentence." Id. at 2656 n.7.
187. Id. at 2653 n.4.
188. Id. at 2654.
189. Id.




1995] INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT 509
their wards.'93 Souter next reasoned that these distinctions were completely
unrelated to the objectionable aspects of the statute."9 He argued that grant-
ing party-status to relatives or guardians, and thus giving them the right to ap-
peal any decision not resulting in institutionalization, in effect presents the
mentally retarded individual with a second prosecutor. 95 He emphasized that
neither the alleged differential in needs for privacy nor the alleged more regu-
lar connection between the relatives and guardians of the mentally retarded
versus those those of the mentally ill, explained any purpose the additional
burden would serve."' Souter concluded there was no rational justification
for imposing the burden of a "second prosecutor" on the allegedly mentally re-
tarded but not the allegedly mentally ill.'97
1II. ANALYSIS
A. Rational Basis Review
To invalidate a facially discriminatory statute under rational basis review,
the challenging party must prove either that there is no legitimate governmen-
tal interest behind the statute or, alternatively, that the classifications at issue
lack any reasonable relationship to that interest."' Under its parens patriae
powers, a state has a legitimate interest in providing care to its citizens with
mental disorders who are unable to care for themselves.'" A state also pos-
sesses authority under its police powers to protect the community from a men-
tally ill or retarded individual with dangerous tendencies.2" A state has a
countervailing interest, however, in protecting the constitutional rights of those
with mental disorders."° In upholding Kentucky's involuntary commitment
scheme as constitutional, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory class
distinctions were rationally related to the state's interest in confining and car-
ing for dangerous mentally retarded persons. 2 The Court ruled that any
plausible argument that conceivably could have been grounds for the
legislature's differential treatment would suffice to justify the discrimina-
tion."0 3
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2656-57.
195. Id. at 2657.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
199. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). The parens patriae doctrine has
fallen into disfavor with the courts when used to uphold involuntary commitment statutes.
Brief for Respondent at 2 n.1 (citing Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 417 (W.D. Ky.
1975)). To justify confinement under current jurisprudence, a judicial determination is re-
quired to show that an individual is dangerous as well as mentally ill or retarded. See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.026, 202B.040 (Michie 1994); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 576 (1975).
200. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
201. Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 145-59.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Court's application of the plausible argument principle further diluted
the effect of the already deferential rational basis standard. The application of
such a diluted test appears inconsistent with the application of the seemingly
more stringent test applied to the ordinance in City of Cleburne.2' Most im-
portantly, the Court failed to consider that a person is only "allegedly" mental-
ly retarded at the commencement of the judicial commitment proceedings."°
The law affords all alleged criminals the benefit of being considered "innocent
until proven guilty."2' Alleged offenders are not given different procedural
protections depending on what crime they are accused of committing. In Ken-
tucky, however, the differential treatment is based on a diagnosis that has not
yet been judicially established. During commitment proceedings in Kentucky,
a person is in effect considered mentally retarded until proven normal.
Until there has been a judicial determination that an individual is both
mentally retarded and dangerous, that individual should be afforded the same
benefit as any other citizen facing confinement. As Justice Souter argued,
differences between the mentally ill and mentally retarded cease to exist when
it comes to their rights to be free from bodily restraint and to avoid
stigmatization.207 According to the Court's ruling in Baxstrom v. Herold,2'
differences between the groups in diagnostic, accuracy or treatment methods
are irrelevant to the purpose of judicially categorizing a person into either
group.2" Had the Court followed its Baxtrom rule in Heller, it would have
concluded that none of the purported differences between the groups could
plausibly be related to the burden of proof required for determination of
whether an individual qualifies for either group. Under the proper analysis, the
justifications for the burden of proof differential have no reasonable relation to
Kentucky's purpose for judicially determining an individual is mentally retard-
ed in the first place.
With respect to the party-status disparity, the state could have a legitimate
interest in protecting the rights of the parents and guardians. Many parents and
guardians can no longer financially, emotionally, or physically care for their
mentally retarded children after they have grown to adulthood, especially if
there has been an increase in violent behavior. In comparison, the parents or
guardians of a mentally ill adult are often not responsible for the care of that
person at the time they become ill and dangerous.2t ° While the parens patri-
204. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see supra note
7.
205. See Brief for Respondent at 18-22 (arguing it is prejudicial to base a proceeding on
an issue that the hearing itself is designed to adjudicate). While Justice Souter did not cite
specifially to Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), in his dissenting opinion, he did
emphasize that the issue in Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993), was "the application of
the provision to adults who have not been shown to be mentally retarded, but who are sim-
ply alleged to be." Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
206. People also generally retain the right to be presumed competent even after hospi-
talization for mental illness. BRAKEL, ET AL. supra note 3, at 258.
207. See supra note 183-84.
208. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
210. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2647 (1993).
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ae doctrine applies in both of these situations, the parents of a mentally retard-
ed adult possess a greater interest in having influence at the commitment pro-
ceedings than the parents of a mentally ill adult. The rights at issue in a com-
mitment proceeding, however, are those of the individuals facing confinement,
not those of their parents or guardians. The mentally retarded have no less of
a right not to be faced with a "second prosecutor" than the mentally ill.
Financial or emotional inability to care for a retarded adult child is not a
sufficient basis for committing that child. If the court determines, however,
that the adult child satisfies the statutory criteria for commitment, then the
state realistically may be in a position to provide better care than the parents
or guardians. As the majority pointed out, the parents and guardians of a men-
tally retarded person also have more information concerning the individual's
condition and behavior that may be helpful in determining the best course of
treatment for the individual.2 ' Thus, this distinction could conceivably be
related to Kentucky's interest in ensuring that mentally retarded persons are
given proper care. Nonetheless, as Baxtrom pointed out, while the difference
in parental knowledge may be relevant to post-adjudicatory decisions regarding
care and treatment, it is entirely irrelevant to determining whether the adult
child is mentally ill or retarded in the first place. The Baxtrom argument,
therefore, overrides the Court's rationale supporting the party-status distinction
because that treatment differential is also employed before adjudication.
Finally, the majority's finding that mentally ill people have a greater need
for privacy at their commitment proceedings lacks evidentiary support. The
Court provided no factual basis for the premise that, in the eyes of the general
public, a sudden infliction of mental illness is more stigmatizing than mental
retardation. Similarly, no factual basis exists for the Majority's premise that
the mentally ill are entitled to more privacy. As in City of Cleburne, this al-
leged distinction seems to be based on an "irrational prejudice"2 2 and is ir-
relevant to any state interest in allowing parents and guardians access to the
commitment proceedings. The absence of rational basis found in City of
Cleburne need not be followed blindly as Justice Souter suggests, however,
since the facts of that case are so dissimilar to Heller.
211. Id.
212. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); see supra
text accompanying note 60. The majority hinted at its own "irrational prejudice" with respect
to this subject matter in its discussion of historical English common law references to the
mentally retarded and mentally ill as "idiots" and "lunatics," respectively. See Heller, 113 S.
Ct. at 2646. The majority used historical distinctions in legal treatment to attempt to justify
the present-day differentials between the two groups. See id. The Court previously exhibited
this type of prejudice when it upheld a statute allowing state institutions to sterilize retarded
persons. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Buck has not been overruled officially,
though the Court later held that procreation was a fundamental right. See Skinner v. Oklaho-
ma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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B. Application of Heightened Scrutiny
For strict scrutiny to apply, a legislative classification must either deny
fundamental rights or discriminate against a "suspect class. ' 2" The Majority
in Heller refused to address the strict scrutiny question for procedural rea-
sons.2 '" The following discussion addresses arguments for the application of
strict scrutiny that nevertheless existed.
I. Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Classification
Though the mentally retarded as a class fail to qualify for heightened
judicial review, they arguably do satisfy some of the Carolene Products crite-
211ria. Mental retardation is unquestionably immutable and the mentally re-
tarded as a class have historically been subjected to purposeful discriminatory
treatment."6 City of Cleburne held, however, that the mentally retarded
lacked sufficient political powerlessness to qualify as a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect class.1 7 While the ADA declared that disabled persons were a "discrete
and insular minority,"2 s this congressional attention most likely supports
rather than contradicts the City of Cleburne rationale.2 9 The congressional
finding also has a questionable effect on the judiciary's equal protection analy-
sis. 2  Thus, in light of City of Cleburne, a claim filed directly under the
ADA might have been a more successful avenue for respondents than a claim
that the mentally retarded constitute a suspect class.
Legislation that discriminates on the basis of gender or illegitimacy, the
two "quasi-suspect" classifications, warrants an intermediate standard of scruti-
ny because, inter alia, those characteristics do not affect a person's ability to
perform or contribute to society.2 Mental retardation undoubtedly affects
213. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
216. See supra text accompanying note 27.
217. See supra text accompanying note 67-68.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74. If courts were bound by the ADA con-
gressional finding, then Congress could designate any group a "discrete and insular minority"
and the courts would have to apply strict scrutiny to any statute treating any such group
differently.
219. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, Heller v. Doe, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993) (No. 92-
351) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner]. But see BRAKEL, ET AL., supra note 3, at 617
(commenting that "Itlhose born with or afflicted with any mental disorder are a weak con-
stituency for asserting rights and obtaining services for themselves and future generations of
mentally disabled persons"). In response to respondents' ADA argument, the state argued that
applying a higher standard of review to legislation distinguishing the mentally retarded might
actually deprive them of benefits. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6. Kentucky also argued that
"[n]o part of the legislative history of the ADA . . . establishes any Congressional intent to
overrule City of Clebume's analysis of the issue." Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5. Even if
Congress had intended to overrule Cir, of Cleburne, it could not "find" that the mentally re-
tarded are a "suspect class" because that would be a legal, not a factual, finding. See supra
note 74.
220. See styr note 74 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying note 31.
[Vol. 72:2
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
one's performance and contribution abilities. Therefore, even though mental
retardation satisfies at least two of the Carolene Products requirements, not all
quasi-suspect class criteria are satisfied. Even if the mentally retarded do not
qualify as a suspect or "quasi-suspect" class, they are still entitled, however, to
protection of their fundamental rights.
2. Fundamental Rights
The Court held that the strict scrutiny question had not been "properly
presented" in the lower courts.22 2 Respondents may have erred by not argu-
ing for strict scrutiny in the beginning stage of the litigation. The Court, how-
ever, failed to acknowledge that the Foucha decision came down six weeks af-
ter the Sixth Circuit heard arguments in Cowherd.223 The respondents intro-
duced their "fundamental rights" issue for the first time in their answer brief
for Heller.224 Respondents had no occasion to introduce the Foucha funda-
mental rights argument sooner because CHR, as petitioner, was responsible for
filing the writ of certiorari and the initial brief delineating the issues in Heller.
Respondents were merely correcting the inaccuracy of petitioners presentation
of the issues, in accordance with Supreme Court rules, 25 and updating their
arguments in light of Foucha. Respondents continued to assert that the Ken-
tucky statute violated equal protection-they did not dispute the accuracy of
the main issue. Respondents simply attempted to strengthen their position by
applying the Supreme Court's Foucha ruling. Therefore, the Court could have
addressed the argument and applied strict scrutiny to Kentucky's class distinc-
tion if it had so chosen. Admittedly, respondents should have based their strict
scrutiny argument on the Youngberg due process decision from the onset.226
Had the statute been invalidated under strict scrutiny instead of rational basis,
CHR may have been less willing to appeal.
In Heller, the majority stated in its minimum rationality reasoning that "a
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along sus-
pect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity." '227 The Court's deni-
al that a fundamental right was at issue seems to contradict its rulings in
Youngberg and Foucha that freedom from bodily restraint is a fundamental
right warranting strict scrutiny of any law threatening to deny that right to a
designated class.228 Surely the Court did not intend to insinuate that freedom
222. See supra text accompanying note 141. It is questionable whether the Court would
have used this rationale to refuse the application of strict scrutiny to a statute with a racial
classification or a statute denying a group the right to vote.
223. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992), was argued on March 30, 1992
and Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992), was decided on May 18, 1992.
224. Brief for Respondent at 23-24. Since the strict scrutiny issue had been presented in
Respondents' brief, the Majority would not have been addressing it sua sponte.
225. SuP. CT. R. 24.2.
226. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), was decided four years before Doe v.
Austin, 668 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Ky. 1986), the first adjudication in the Heller litigation. See
supra text accompanying notes 97-105.
227. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637. 2642 (1993).
228. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1992).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
from bodily restraint is not a fundamental right of the mentally retarded.
The Court's decision not to address the issue of strict scrutiny was the
most questionable ruling in Heller. Very few cases of impaired fundamental
rights are upheld when strictly scrutinized.229 Had the Court applied their
Youngberg/Foucha ruling to Heller, it likely would have held that both statuto-
ry distinctions violated the Equal Protection Clause.
C. Reasonable Doubt Standard for All Facing Confinement
A standard of proof reflects the value society places on individual liber-
ty.2" The mentally ill and the mentally retarded have equal liberty inter-
ests."' Thus, the burden of proof required to involuntarily commit both
classes should be identical. Allowing the lower "clear and convincing" stan-
dard in commitment proceedings suggests that our society values the liberty
rights of the allegedly mentally deficient less than those of alleged criminals.
This proposition is inconsistent with the Court's ruling in Vitek that the loss of
liberty produced by involuntary commitment is greater than the loss of free-
dom from criminal confinement.232 If proving "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that a person committed a crime is not an excessive requirement for the state,
then proving "beyond a reasonable doubt" that a person is mentally ill or re-
tarded, and dangerous, should not be excessively burdensome either. This is
especially true for the mentally retarded, who are actually easier to diagnose
and less likely to ever be released from confinement.233 Since commitment
for the mentally retarded is usually equivalent to a "life sentence," members of
that group are entitled to the "reasonable doubt" standard as much or more
than the mentally ill or criminally accused.
The mentally retarded, the mentally ill, and the criminally accused are all
"similarly situated" groups when facing involuntary confinement. Therefore,
that confinement should be allowed only when the state can prove "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that restriction of liberty is justified. In Addington, the
Court explicitly sanctioned the states' freedom to apply the reasonable doubt
standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings." The flexibility afford-
ed by the Addington decision should be employed with respect to both the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill.
229. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1452 (2d ed.
1988). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
230. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
231. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
232. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 149 and 186.




In Heller, the Supreme Court failed to capitalize on an opportunity to
establish that the mentally retarded and the mentally ill have equal rights un-
der the Constitution. By declining to apply strict scrutiny, the Court "leaned
over backwards" in order to sustain Kentucky's statutory distinction by lending
"extraordinary deference" to the rational basis test. 35 Even under minimum
rationality review, however, the court should have recognized that the mentally
ill and the mentally retarded have equal liberty interests before adjudication.
The majority's refusal to address the fundamental rights issue in Heller has
merely delayed that decision to a later date. In the interim, the Court's avoid-
ance tactics could result in individuals being involuntarily committed while
there is still a "reasonable doubt" whether they are mentally retarded and
dangerous.
Mari-Rae Sopper
235. See supra note 7 and text accompanying note 204.
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